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Abstract
This paper investigates how two competing manufacturers should invest in defensive and offensive advertising in
a two-segment market and whether they should each adopt a decentralized or an integrated channel if their goal is
to maximize total channel profits. We find that, manufacturers in decentralized channels can exclusively undertake
either of the two types of advertising or combine the two at the equilibrium. In integrated channels, they can
either combine the two or exclusively undertake defensive advertising. When multiple equilibria exist, strategies
that combine both types of advertising should be preferred to exclusive defensive advertising strategies, which
are better than exclusive offensive advertising strategies. Also, total channel profits are higher in decentralized
channels than in integrated channels when the brands are moderately or highly substitutable. Conversely, total
channel profits of integrated channels are higher than those of decentralized channels in areas where the brands are
relatively differentiated and the offensive advertising retaliatory capacity of the rival is stronger. Theoretical and
managerial implications of these findings are discussed.
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1. Introduction
Increasingly, firms distinguish between consumers who purchase or are more likely to purchase their
products and those who purchase or are more likely to purchase from their rivals. These firms have the
strategic option to either target exclusively one of these two market segments or both at the same time
to achieve their marketing goals. The pursuit of any of these strategic options generally affects product,
pricing, marketing communications, and distribution decisions as firms strive to develop distinctive po-
sitioning to effectively appeal to the selected market segment(s). This research, as other studies before
it, focuses on advertising targeting (e.g., Iyer et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2001; Zhang et al., 2016). Be-
cause several firms spend substantial shares of their marketing budgets on advertising, finding optimal
advertising targeting schemes is of great interest for both managers and researchers.
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Conventional knowledge in marketing strategy claims that differentiated marketing strategies adapted
to each market segment tend to be more effective, but suffer from high costs; concentrated marketing
strategies that focus only on a single or a few market segments fit companies with limited resources, but
may not be viable due to their limited market coverage; and finally, undifferentiated marketing strategies
that treat the whole market as a single segment tend to be cheaper, but could also be less effective where
consumer preferences are heterogeneous. However, this conventional knowledge remains however very
generic and cannot serve as a practical framework for advertising targeting, especially in a competitive
context. A few analytical works have investigated directly or indirectly advertising targeting in various
contexts (e.g., Erickson, 1993; Iyer et al., 2005; Martı´n-Herra´n et al., 2012; Wang et al, 2011; Zhang et al,
2016). For instance, in a duopoly market, Iyer et al. (2005) found that advertising targeting that focuses
on consumers whose preference match a product’s attribute is more effective than a uniform advertis-
ing run across segments. In a bilateral monopoly, Zhang et al. (2016) found that advertising targeting,
compared to uniform advertising directed to the whole market, increases the manufacturer profit at the
expense of the retailer. However, many of these previous works do not offer advertisers the possibility
to use differentiated advertising programs to target different market segments. Some exceptions include
the works by Erickson (1993), Martı´n-Herra´n et al. (2012), and Martı´n-Herra´n and Sigue´ (2018), which
allow competitors, in a market share rivalry, to use offensive and defensive advertising to respectively
attack the rival’s market share and defend their own market share. Comparing the outcomes of advertis-
ing targeting in a single market segment to the outcomes of running the same advertising in the whole
market when consumers have different brand preferences may lead to suboptimal advertising strategies
(e.g., Iyer et al, 2005). In particular, it can lead to the belief that advertising to consumers who mainly
prefer rivals’ products is wasting advertising money as these consumers ultimately buy from those rivals.
This belief goes against the conventional wisdom that supports the use of differentiated marketing strate-
gies in heterogeneous markets. Also, it is not consistent with some business practices, such as the use of
comparative advertising where the obvious goal of the advertiser is to change customer preferences (see,
Shaffer and Zettelmeyer (2009)).
To challenge the above belief and investigate other issues related to vertical interactions on advertising
targeting, we have developed an analytical model of two competing channels, in which a manufacturer
deals with an exclusive retailer who sells a competing brand in a market. The market is divided into two
groups of consumers. Without advertising, consumers who prefer one brand are less likely to prefer the
competing brand and vice versa. There are a few consumers, in between, who can purchase either brand,
but their role is negligible. Building on Erickson (1993),Martı´n-Herra´n et al. (2012) and Martı´n-Herra´n
and Sigue´ (2018), we consider that manufacturers in the two channels have the possibility of undertaking
two differentiated advertising programs targeted to these two market segments. Advertising targeted to
own customer base is called defensive advertising as it stimulates demand from consumers who naturally
prefer the brand and, by so doing, limits the effects of any advertising assault from the rival. Advertising
targeted to consumers who naturally prefer the rival’s product is called offensive advertising and aims
mainly to expand a firm’s customer base at the expense of the rival. In addition, the model considers
that a consumer’s preference toward a given brand depends, among others, on the retail price set by
the exclusive retailer. In such a configuration, several factors may influence advertising targeting and
investments, including horizontal competition across channels, vertical externalities within channels,
and the relative strength of the competitors. This research hopes to identify some of these factors by
answering the following questions:
1. Should manufacturers, in both decentralized and integrated channels, exclusively direct their adver-
tising efforts either to their own customer base or the rival’s customer base, or should they simultaneously
advertise to the two market segments at the equilibrium?
2. What should the optimal channel structure be if channel members act so as to maximize total
channel profits?
Answering to the above questions expands our current knowledge base on advertising targeting by
identifying the conditions under which competing manufacturers, in decentralized and integrated chan-
nels, can adopt differentiated advertising approaches that appeal specifically to different market seg-
ments. This paper is related to previous research in competitive advertising as follows. First, works based
on the traditional Lanchester model investigate offensive advertising investments when firms battle for
market shares over time (See, Huang et al. (2012) for a review). Some extensions of these works study
both offensive and defensive advertising (e.g., Erickson 1993, Martı´n-Herra´n et al., 2012). Their find-
ings describe how competitive firms should optimally invest in both offensive and defensive advertising
as their market shares evolve over time. For instance, Martı´n-Herra´n et al. (2012) report findings that
support the view that a firm may find it optimal to exclusively undertake either one of the two types of
advertising or combine the two at the same moment over time. However, this body of research overlooks
critical aspects considered in this study, including the role of retailers, pricing decisions, and customer
preferences in advertising competition.
Second, a central question of this research is whether to target consumers who have a strong prefer-
ence for the firm’s brand and/or those who primarily prefer the rival’s brand. Iyer et al. (2005) studied a
similar question in a context where competing firms can either focus their advertising on their customer
bases or expand it to cover the entire market. They found that, compared to the situation where adver-
tising is done to uniformly cover the entire market, advertising that exclusively focuses on the firm’s
own customer base increases equilibrium profits due to enhanced effectiveness and brand differentia-
tion. Martı´n-Herra´n and Sigue´ (2018) allowed the competitors to consider both defensive and offensive
advertising to respectively target their own and their rival’s customer bases. However, these two works
overlook vertical interactions. On the other hand, Zhang et al. (2016) investigated advertising targeting
in a bilateral monopoly. They adopted Iyer et al.’s definition of advertising targeting in the context where
advertising is mainly informative. Their findings indicate that, when vertical interactions are considered,
a profit maximizing manufacturer may adopt targeted advertising or uniform advertising depending on
some identified conditions. This latter work did however disregard competition, which is a key ingredi-
ent of our research. Moreover, the manufacturer did not have the opportunity to undertake two types of
advertising that can specifically appeal to each market segment as we do in this research.
Third, another group of studies has focused on the persuasive role of advertising in the context of
competition in a channel structure where competing manufacturers sell their product through a single
dealer (e.g., Shaffer and Zettelmeyer, 2004; Wu et al., Wang 2009). These works investigate whether
channel members are better or worse off with manufacturers’ advertising activities that increase brand
differentiation or increase transportation costs in Hotelling-type models (Hotelling, 1929). Their find-
ings support the view that the impact of persuasive advertising on channel members’ profits depend on
the target market segments. In particular, Wu et al. (2009) found that persuasive advertising can lead to
a Pareto improvement along the entire distribution channel if targeted wisely. Exploring this research
further, Shaffer and Zettelmeyer (2009) studied whether two competing manufacturers in a distribution
channel should undertake comparative or noncomparative advertising. They found that, all else being
equal, a manufacturer prefers comparative to noncomparative advertising when advertising is targeted to
their own customer base, while noncomparative advertising is preferred when advertising is directed to
their rival’s customer base. Departing from this research, we study a channel structure in which manu-
facturers sell their products to two exclusive dealers. As a result, we are able to compare integrated and
decentralized channel performances. Moreover, while we also use a Hotelling-type model, advertising is
more informative in our model and does not directly affect brand differentiation.
Finally, the issue of whether marketing channels should be decentralized or integrated (coordinated)
has been heavily investigated in the literature. In bilateral monopoly contexts, integrated channels are
known to perform better than decentralized channels as they do not suffer from vertical externalities
such as double marginalization and under-investment in advertising (e.g., Ingene et al, 2012). McGuire
and Staelin (1983) demonstrated that when competition is considered both at the manufacturers’ and
retailers’ levels, decentralized channels may perform better due to the fact that independent retailers
attenuate price competition between highly substitutable products. Since then, several works have been
undertaken along this line to test the robustness of this theory (e.g., Coughlan, 1985; Moorthy, 1988;
Trivedi, 1998; Wang et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2012). This paper shares some similarities with the
papers by Wang et al. (2011) and Zhang et al. (2012), which investigated whether decentralized channels
could still perform better than integrated channels when competition between channels goes beyond
prices to also include advertising. Wang et al. (2011) found that, channel decentralization may intensify
advertising competition and damage channel profits. In such a context, in opposition to McGuire and
Stealin’s theory, channel integration is preferred over channel decentralization. These authors consider
persuasive advertising, which increases consumers’ gross valuation of the advertised brand. Zhang et al.
(2012) obtained opposite findings with informative advertising, i.e., decentralization improves channel
profits when products are highly substitutable. Studying the profitability of cooperative advertising in
the same channel structure, Karray et al. (2017) recently found that a cooperative advertising offer can
also help a decentralized channel achieve a better performance than an integrated channel when products
are highly substitutable. Building on these previous works, we use informative advertising and consider
that the manufacturers can conduct offensive and defensive advertising directed at two different market
segments. This allows us to investigate differentiated advertising targeting strategies that are overlooked
in the current literature. In addition, we also examine the impact of the relative power of competitors and
the relative effectiveness of offensive and defensive advertising on targeting decisions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents
the equilibrium advertising strategies for decentralized channels, while Section 4 does the same for
integrated channels. Section 5 identifies the conditions under which competing manufacturers prefer
channel decentralization to channel integration. Section 6 offers conclusions and discusses theoretical
and managerial implications.
2. The model
We consider a local market with n potential consumers who can purchase two brands manufactured by
two competing manufacturers of the same product via two exclusive dealers. Consumers can only pur-
chase one unit of the product and differ in their preferences over the two brands on a single attribute. In
particular, Brand i performs very well on this attribute and obtains the highest score, which is 1, while
Brand j’s performance is not as good as the first and is given the score of 0. Consumers’ preferences
toward these two brands are distributed uniformly along these two extremes. Therefore, consumers who
like one brand the most like the other the least. They incur a “transportation cost”, t , per unit of dis-
tance traveled from their ideal product. The parameter t captures consumer sensitivity to the product’s
attribute. Consumers preferring the product at both extremes make their purchase without bearing any
transportation cost. Denoting by v the gross value attached to using a unit of either of the two brands,
consumers who prefer Brand i derive a utility v − pi from purchasing it from Dealer i and a utility
v − t − pj from purchasing Brand j from Dealer j, where pi and pj are the retail prices of the two
brands.
Consumers purchase a brand of this product only if it gives them a positive surplus. Therefore, the
marginal consumer whose ideal product is located at a distance, d ∈ [0, 1], is indifferent buying either
brand if d meets the following condition: v − p1 − td = v − p2 − t(1 − d). As a result, we obtain the
following:
d =
t− (p1 − p2)
2t
.
Ideally, consumers whose ideal products are located on the left hand side of d purchase from Brand 1,
while those whose ideal products are located on the right hand side of d prefer Brand 2. Therefore, if we
denote xi the market base of Brand i, we obtain x1 = d and x2 = 1− d. The market base of Brand i can
be considered as its potential market share and represents the percentage of customers who can purchase
this brand at the market price if everything else is equal:
xi =
t− (pi − pj)
2t
, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
The market bases of the two brands therefore depend on their retail prices. We consider that dealers
do not price-discriminate and apply the same price to all consumers regardless of their brand preference.
Alternatively, targeted pricing based on consumers’ preference could be used (e.g., Iyer et al., 2005;
Zhang et al., 2016), but will distract us from the main focus on this research, which is the analysis of
optimal offensive and defensive advertising strategies.
Given consumers’ preferences across brands, the manufacturer i sets a wholesale price,wi, and under-
takes defensive (Di) and/or offensive (Oi) advertising to stimulate demand, given by:
qi = nxigi(Oj ,Di) + nxjli(Oi), i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
where gi(Oj ,Di) is a positive and negative function of Di and Oj , respectively, while li(Oi) is a positive
function of Oi. Whether offensive or offensive, the advertising does not aim at changing consumers’
preferences in this setup. In this sense, it is not persuasive as defined in some previous works (e.g.,
Shaffer and Zettelmeyer, 2004; Wu et al., 2009). Consumers are also aware of the two brands and their
distinctive characteristics. The role of both defensive and offensive advertising is similar to reminder
advertising, which aims at keeping a brand at the top of consumers’ minds in a mature market (Iyer et
al., 2005). This characterization of advertising is consistent with Lanchester-type models in which firms
primarily battle to stay in consumers’ minds at the time of purchase. Offensive advertising that appeals
to the rival’s market base is essentially combative. Therefore, while some consumers in a firm’s market
may be very committed to a brand, in some cases, defensive advertising targeted at their own market base
could be necessary to limit the effects of the rival’s assault in consumers’ minds and to stimulate demand
from less committed consumers. Remember, the two dealers also influence the demand functions through
their retail prices, which affects the size of each manufacturer’s customer base.
For simplicity, we choose the following specifications for the functions gi(Oj ,Di) and li(Oi):
gi(Oj ,Di) = −δ
√
Oj +
√
Di and li(Oi) = θ
√
Oi.
The parameters θ and δ are non-negative and respectively denote the firm’s own and the rival’s offen-
sive advertising effects on the demand functions. While we do not make any a priori assumption on the
relative importance of the parameters θ and δ, the difference, θ − δ, could be considered as an indicator
of the intensity of the retaliatory attack of the rival. When θ = δ, a firm can respond in kind or with the
same strength to an offensive advertising assault from the rival. Alternatively, when θ > δ or θ < δ, the
attacker’s offensive advertising is more or less powerful than that of the rival. We therefore consider the
general case when a firm initiates an offensive advertising attack, it can expect its rival to react either
with an identical offensive advertising response or with a stronger or weaker offensive advertising re-
sponse. On the other hand, the effect of defensive advertising is normalized to 1. Conventional wisdom
in marketing assumes that defensive marketing activities or marketing activities targeted to a firm’s own
customer base are more effective than those aiming to attract competitors’ customers. On this basis, we
consider that the effectiveness of offensive advertising is, at best, equal to that of defensive advertising,
i.e., θ ≤ 1.
Concave functions are used to take into account the decreasing returns on investments in both offen-
sive and defensive advertising (e.g., Karray, 2013). The parameters c1 and c2 denote the unitary cost of
both offensive and defensive advertising activities, respectively, and are also non-negative. We assume
identical unitary advertising costs across channels. Offensive and defensive advertising costs enter lin-
early in the manufacturers’ profit functions below. As it is common in the marketing channel literature,
we normalize the production and other administrative costs to zero. The manufacturer’s and retailer’s
profits for each brand are given by:
Mi = wiqi − c1Oi − c2Di, Ri = (pi − wi)qi, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
The symmetry of the problem leads us to focus on symmetric equilibria, hence channel members make
identical decisions, i.e., O1 = O2 = O, D1 = D2 = D, p1 = p2 = p, and w1 = w2 = w. As a result,
demand and profit functions become:
q = nx((θ − δ)
√
O +
√
D), M = wq − c1O − c2D, R = (p− w)q.
Observe that when θ − δ ≥ 0, meaning that a firm’s offensive advertising is either of the same
strength or stronger than that of the rival, its demand function is always positive. Conversely, if the
rival’s offensive marketing is stronger,i.e. θ < δ, defensive marketing plays a key role for the survival
of the firm as its demand could be reduced to zero. The model specification above implies that the
two firms get zero demands and profits if they do not carry out any of the two types of advertising.
This simplification is made to allow us to focus on the impact of offensive and defensive advertising
on channel competition, which is the distinctive contribution of this research. As we have assumed a
mature market, one can easily add a constant term to the demand function to indicate that demands
remain unchanged if the two firms do not advertise. However, such a specification will not change the
qualitative findings of our simplified model.
3. Decentralized channels
This section investigates the type of advertising activities manufacturers should undertake at the equi-
librium in decentralized channels in which channel members separately set their respective decision
variables so as to maximize their individual profits. As is common in the marketing literature, in each
channel, the manufacturer acts first as the channel leader and the retailer responds to the manufacturer’s
move as the follower. A Stackelberg game is therefore played between the manufacturer and retailer in
each channel. Members of the two channels compete both at the manufacturer and retailer levels. We use
the Nash equilibrium concept as the players simultaneously set their decision variables at each level.
We are able to analytically characterize two equilibria that correspond to the corner solutions where
the two manufacturers exclusively undertake either offensive advertising or defensive advertising (see
Appendix A). Hereafter, these two equilibria are respectively called Exclusive Offensive Advertising
(EOA) and Exclusive Defensive Advertising (EDA) equilibria. The interior solution for the game where
competing manufacturers simultaneously invest in both offensive and defensive advertising cannot be
analytically characterized, except in the scenario where δ = θ. However, we have developed an algorithm
to numerically characterize the interior solution of this game. This solution is called Offensive-Defensive
Advertising (ODA) equilibrium.
The players’ strategies and profits for these three equilibria depend on the game parameters, including
n, t, c1, c2, δ, and θ. This implies that some restrictions need to be imposed on the parameters to satisfy
the concavity conditions and obtain non-negative profits, positive price, advertising efforts, and demands
as well as to ensure that the sales of the two dealers do not exceed the number of potential consumers.
As a matter of fact, it can easily be proven that the EOA equilibrium is only feasible if the following
condition is satisfied: θ < δ < 3θ. Given the complexity of the necessary conditions, we numerically
analyze the feasibility of the three equilibria in the following figures. To achieve this goal, we fix n = 1
and c1 = 1 and identify the feasibility regions for the different equilibria for three different values of
c2 = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, while varying the parameters t and θ in the following ranges: t ∈ (0, 4], and
θ ∈ [0, 1].
Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c illustrate the scenario where δ = θ, meaning the two manufacturers have the
same offensive strength. In other words, an attack by a manufacturer is met by a response of identical
strength from the rival.
Similar figures are obtained for the scenario where a firm’s offensive advertising is more effective
than that of the rival (δ = 0.5θ). Thus, the following discussion also applies to this scenario. Figures
1a, 1b, and 1c confirm the analytical finding that the EOA equilibrium is not feasible in this area of the
parameter space. An exclusive attack on the rival’s customer base when he can retaliate with the same or
smaller intensity is not advisable because both manufacturers would engage in an offensive advertising
war that would lead to wasteful offensive advertising expenditures that would be reciprocally canceled
out. On the other hand, there are three different areas in Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c. In the largest area, none
of the three equilibria is feasible. This area is associated with higher transportation costs. Therefore,
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Fig. 1. Feasibility scenario δ = θ for different values of c2. First line, Figure 1a c2 = 0.25 left; Figure 1b c2 = 0.5 right.
Second line, Figure 1c c2 = 0.75.
everything else being equal, manufacturers do not undertake both offensive and defensive advertising if
the two brands are highly differentiated. This prevents manufacturers from spending heavily to attract
the rival’s customers and investing to keep the customers who prefer their brand. In the other two areas,
the two brands are highly or moderately substitutable; either both the EDA and ODA equilibria are si-
multaneously feasible or the EDA equilibrium is feasible alone. The feasibility area increases with the
cost of defensive advertising. Higher defensive advertising costs prevent manufacturers from defending
heavily and increase opportunities to the rival’s attack even when the brands are relatively well differen-
tiated. The relative effectiveness of offensive advertising with respect to defensive advertising also plays
a key role. The area of feasibility of the ODA equilibrium decreases as the relative effectiveness of of-
fensive advertising grows. Depending on the other parameters, the EDA equilibrium becomes the unique
equilibrium if the effectiveness of offensive advertising is large enough or identical to that of defensive
marketing. This suggests that, knowing that customers can easily move from one brand to another due
to offensive advertising, competitors find it optimal to concentrate their advertising efforts on consumers
who primarily prefer their brand.
On the other hand, when a firm’s offensive advertising is less effective than that of the rival (δ = 1.5θ),
the conditions under which the equilibria are feasible change drastically, as illustrated in Figures 2a, 2b,
and 2c.
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Fig. 2. Feasibility scenario δ = 1.5θ for different values of c2. First line, Figure 2a c2 = 0.25 left; Figure 2b c2 = 0.5 right.
Second line, Figure 2c c2 = 0.75.
In Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c, the EOA equilibrium is now always feasible, while the EDA and ODA equi-
libria, everything being equal, could only be feasible when the products are relatively undifferentiated.
This can be explained by the firm’s need to protect their own customer base from the rival’s attack when
the products are substitutable. Surprisingly, manufacturers invest in offensive advertising even for well
differentiated products when the retaliatory capacity of the rival is strong.
The existence of multiple equilibria in some areas of the parameter space raises the question of which
equilibrium should be implemented by profit maximizing manufacturers. We postulate that each man-
ufacturer, acting as a channel leader, should implement the equilibrium that provides the greatest prof-
its. Considering the feasibility conditions discussed above, we numerically compare the manufacturers’
profits for the ODA, EOA and EDA equilibria. Our findings are summarized in the following claims.
Claim 1. In scenarios where δ = θ and δ = 0.5θ, manufacturers prefer the ODA equilibrium to the
EDA equilibrium, which is implemented only when it is the unique equilibrium.The EOA is unfeasible.
Claim 2. In scenarios where δ = 1.5θ, manufacturers prefer the ODA equilibrium to the EDA equilib-
rium, which is also preferred to the EOA equilibrium. The EOA equilibrium is played only when it is
the unique equilibrium.
Obviously, manufacturers may implement either of the three equilibria depending on the values of
the game parameters. In the presence of multiple equilibria, the ODA equilibrium should come first
followed by the EDA equilibrium. The EOA equilibrium should only be considered if neither of the
other two equilibria is feasible. This could only occur when the products are weakly substitutable and
the offensive advertising of the rival is more effective. The comparisons of the players’ strategies in areas
where multiple equilibria exist reveal that ODA strategies, i.e., pODA, wODA,DODA and OODA, are
always higher than the corresponding EDA and EOA strategies. Also, EDA strategies (pEDA andwEDA)
are always higher than the corresponding EOA strategies (pEOA and wEOA). Thus, the adoption of the
EOA equilibrium in decentralized channels, which is synonymous with engaging in an advertising war,
brings prices down for both manufacturers and dealers compared to the EDA equilibrium and damages
the manufacturers’ profits. Conversely, the adoption of the ODA equilibrium leads to heavy investments
in offensive and defensive advertising that allow manufacturers to fully cover the entire market, charge
higher prices, and enhance their profits. EDA strategies, which are similar to targeted advertising in
previous research (e.g., Iyer et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2016) allow manufacturers to reduce advertising
costs by focusing on their customer base. Surprisingly, the implementation of the EDA equilibrium
intensifies price competition due to its limited market coverage. As a result of their uniform pricing
policies, dealers have no choice but to significantly reduce retail prices when manufacturers advertise
only to their market base to effectively compete in the entire market.
4. Integrated channels
This section investigates the type of advertising activities members of a given symmetric channel should
undertake at the equilibrium if they eliminate vertical externalities to maximize their joint profit functions
given by:
Ti = piqi − c1Oi − c2Di, i = 1, 2.
Under the symmetric scenario the profit functions simplify as follows:
T = pq − c1O − c2D.
The problem is reduced to a standard duopoly competition as the two channels are now fully integrated
(e.g., Iyer et al., 2005). A Nash game is played between the two integrated channels. As in the case of
decentralized channels, we investigate the existence of an interior solution and two corner solutions and
we are able to analytically characterize the EDA and ODA equilibria and find that the EOA equilibrium
is unfeasible (See Appendix B).
The players’ strategies and profits for the ODA equilibrium depend on the game parameters, including
n, t, c1, c2, δ, and θ. Again, some restrictions need to be imposed on the parameters to satisfy the concav-
ity conditions and obtain non-negative profits, positive price, advertising efforts, and demands as well as
to ensure that the sales of the two integrated channels do not exceed the number of potential consumers.
On the other hand, the players’ strategies and profits for the EDA equilibrium depend exclusively on the
parameters n, t,and c2. In this case, the following condition should be met to ensure that the sales of the
two integrated channels do not exceed the number of potential consumers: t ≤ 4c2/n.
We display the feasibility conditions of the EDA and ODA equilibria for the same parameter values
as those used in the case of decentralized channels in Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c. In particular, n = 1, c1 = 1
and c2 = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, while t and θ vary in the following ranges: t ∈ (0, 4] and θ ∈ [0, 1]. Remember,
the parameter θ does not affect the EDA equilibrium. Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c are plotted for δ = θ and
are qualitatively similar to those obtained for δ = 0.5θ and δ = 1.5θ.
Similar to the case of decentralized channels, in the upper parts of these figures which correspond
to higher transportation costs, neither the EDA equilibrium nor the ODA equilibrium is feasible. The
feasibility areas of these two equilibria expand as the defensive advertising costs increase. In addition,
the feasibility area of the ODA equilibrium is a subset of the feasibility area of the EDA equilibrium.
Stated differently, investments in both offensive and defensive advertising are only possible when the
two firms can also choose to exclusively invest in defensive advertising. The reverse is not true. As a
result, the EDA equilibrium is the unique equilibrium when offensive advertising is either as effective
as defensive advertising or highly effective. Again, advertising is exclusively allocated to a firm’s own
customer base when the potential of engaging in an offensive advertising war is high.
Given the existence of two equilibria in some areas of the parameter space, the two integrated channels
have to determine the equilibrium to be implemented. We compare channel profits under the EDA and
the ODA equilibria to identify the best strategy for the two integrated channels. Our findings are stated
in the following claim.
Claim 3. Members of an integrated channel prefer the ODA equilibrium to the EDA equilibrium, which
is played only when the former is unfeasible.
To better understand this claim, we further compare the strategies of the players for these two equi-
libria. In addition to the fact that offensive advertising is also undertaken in the ODA equilibrium, this
analysis reveals that both the retail price and the defensive advertising of the ODA equilibrium are always
greater than those of the EDA equilibrium, i.e.:
pODAInt > p
EDA
Int , D
ODA
Int > D
EDA
Int , O
ODA
Int > O
EDA
Int = 0,
where the subscript Int stands for integrated channel. In integrated channels, channel members heavily
invest to attack the rival’s channel and to protect their customer base and this offers the opportunity
to charge higher prices. Thus, consistent with our previous finding, limiting advertising only to one’s
own customer base reduces advertising expenditures, but also hurts channel profits even when vertical
channel externalities are taken out.
To conclude, either the EDA equilibrium or the ODA equilibrium can be implemented in an integrated
channel, while the EOA equilibrium, which is synonymous with an advertising war between channels,
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Fig. 3. Feasibility scenario δ = θ for different values of c2. First line, Figure 3a c2 = 0.25 left; Figure 3b c2 = 0.5 right.
Second line, Figure 3c c2 = 0.75.
is unrealistic.
5. Decentralized vs. integrated channels
In this section, we investigate how strategies and profits compare in the integrated and decentralized
channels. The different comparisons are made for the same values of the parameters used previously
to establish the feasibility regions of the different equilibria. Denoting by ΠT int = Ti the total profits
of each integrated channel and by ΠT = Mi + Ri the total profits of each decentralized channel, we
compare ΠT int and ΠT . The following claim summarizes our findings:
Claim 4. (i) For δ = 0.5θ and δ = θ, the total channel profits are always greater in the decentralized
channels than in the integrated channels regardless of the equilibrium implemented, i.e., ΠT > ΠT int;
(ii) for δ = 1.5θ , total channel profits of the decentralized and integrated channels compare as follows:
ΠODAT > Π
ODA
Tint , Π
EDA
T > Π
ODA
Tint , Π
ODA
T > Π
EDA
Tint , Π
EDA
T > Π
EDA
Tint ,
ΠEOAT < Π
ODA
Tint , Π
EOA
T < Π
EDA
Tint .
The findings in the above claim suggest that, in most areas, the total profits are higher in decentralized
channels than in integrated channels when the brands are highly substitutable. This finding is consistent
with Zhang et al. (2012) who reached a similar conclusion when competing manufacturers undertake
informative advertising. Conversely, the total channel profits are higher when channels are integrated
than when they are decentralized in areas where the products are relatively well differentiated and the
offensive advertising retaliatory capacity of the rival is stronger, i.e., δ = 1.5θ. In these areas, the EOA
equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the decentralized channel game, while integrated channels can
adopt either the ODA or the EDA equilibria. This implies that integrated channels can better target
advertising than decentralized channels when the product are differentiated and the rival is offensively
very strong. The latter prefer to engage in offensive advertising rivalry. However, such a move hurts their
bottom line.
We further compare the players’ strategies to better understand the implications of Claim 4. Given the
feasibility conditions, when δ = θ or δ = 0.5θ, we consider four cases: (1) ODA integrated channel vs.
ODA decentralized channel, (2) ODA integrated channel vs. EDA decentralized channel, (3) EDA inte-
grated channel vs. ODA decentralized channel, and (4) EDA integrated channel vs. EDA decentralized
channel. The results of these comparisons are summarized in the claim below:
Claim 5. If δ = θ or δ = 0.5θ, the players’ strategies in integrated and decentralized channels compare
as follows:
pODA > pODAint , D
ODA > DODAint , O
ODA < OODAint ,
pEDA > pODAint , D
EDA > DODAint , O
EDA = 0 < OODAint ,
pODA > pEDAint , D
ODA > DEDAint , O
ODA > OEDAint = 0,
pEDA > pEDAint , D
EDA > DEDAint , O
EDA = OEDAint = 0.
Remember, the above comparisons are only possible when the brands are moderately or highly sub-
stitutable. As expected, retail prices of the decentralized channels are higher than those of the inte-
grated channels regardless of the type of advertising programs implemented. This is mostly due to the
well-documented double marginalization phenomenon. Defensive advertising expenditures are higher
in decentralized channels than in integrated channels, which means that decentralization allows channel
members to further focus advertising efforts on their respective customer base. On the other hand, except
when offensive marketing is not conducted in either decentralized channels or in integrated channels, in-
tegrated channels invest more in offensive advertising than decentralized channels. These findings are in
line with the “retailer-buffer” role as offensive advertising is intended (and defensive advertising is not
intended) to increase the rivalry between the two channels.
On the other hand, δ = 1.5θ, given the feasibility conditions, six cases are considered: (1) ODA
integrated channel vs. ODA decentralized channel, (2) ODA integrated channel vs. EDA decentralized
channel, (3) ODA integrated channel vs. EOA decentralized channel, (4) EDA integrated channel vs.
ODA decentralized channel, (5) EDA integrated channel vs. EDA decentralized channel, and (6) EDA
integrated channel vs. EOA decentralized channel. The results of the comparisons are as follows:
Claim 6. If δ = 1.5θ, the players’ strategies in integrated and decentralized channels compare as follows:
pODA > pODAint , D
ODA > DODAint , O
ODA < OODAint ,
pEDA > pODAint , D
EDA > DODAint , O
EDA = 0 < OODAint ,
pODA > pEDAint , D
ODA > DEDAint , O
ODA > OEDAint = 0,
pEDA > pEDAint , D
EDA > DEDAint , O
EDA = OEDAint = 0,
pEOA < pEDAint , D
EOA = 0 < DEDAint , O
EOA > OEDAint = 0.
pEOA < pODAint , D
EOA = 0 < DODAint , O
EOA < OODAint ,
Observe that the findings of Claim 5 obtained for δ = θ or δ = 0.5θ are qualitatively identical to those
of Claim 6 when the feasible equilibria are the same, i.e., decentralized channels’ prices and defensive
advertising expenditures are higher, while their offensive advertising expenditures are lower compared
to those of the integrated channels, except when the corresponding strategy is set to zero in either case.
New in Claim 6 are the comparisons that involve the EOA equilibrium in decentralized channels. As
previously discussed, this equilibrium is only implemented when the brands are highly differentiated
and the retaliatory capacity of the rival is stronger. Surprisingly, channel decentralization leads to lower
prices and offensive advertising expenditures compared to channel integration. In corresponding areas,
integrated channel members either invest exclusively in defensive advertising or combine offensive and
defensive advertising to maintain higher prices and avoid a wasteful offensive advertising competition
between channels.
Summarizing, channel decentralization leads to higher prices and defensive advertising expenditures,
lower offensive advertising expenditures, and higher profits than channel integration when the products
are moderately or highly substitutable. Conversely, it produces lower profits and prices, nullifies defen-
sive advertising activities, and may conduct to higher or lower offensive marketing activities, depending
on the equilibria being compared, when the products are highly differentiated and the retaliatory capacity
of the rival is stronger.
6. Conclusion
This paper has investigated pricing and advertising competition between two exclusive channels that
serve two market segments. Consumers naturally prefer to purchase from one channel, but can purchase
from either channel depending on manufacturers’ marketing efforts. A manufacturer has the possibility
to undertake defensive and/or offensive advertising to protect their own market base and/or attack the
rival’s market base, respectively. The questions addressed in this paper are: Should manufacturers, in
both decentralized and integrated channels, exclusively direct their advertising efforts either to their own
customer base or the rival’s customer base, or should they simultaneously advertise to the two market
segments at the equilibrium? What should the optimal channel structure be if channel members act so
as to maximize total channel profits? A game theoretic model that allows these two questions to be ad-
dressed was developed and analyzed. Three equilibria were characterized in the context of decentralized
channels, namely the EOA (Exclusive Offensive Advertising), EDA (Exclusive Defensive Advertising),
and ODA equilibria (Offensive-Defensive Advertising) and two equilibria were obtained for integrated
channels, including the EDA and ODA equilibria.
In response to the first question, we found that decentralized channels can implement any one of the
three equilibria depending on their feasibility conditions. In particular, when multiple equilibria exist, the
ODA equilibrium is preferred to the EDA equilibrium, which itself is preferred to the EOA equilibrium.
The EOA equilibrium should only be implemented when it is unique. This occurs only when the products
are highly differentiated and the offensive advertising retaliatory capacity of the rival is stronger. On the
other hand, integrated channels prefer the ODA equilibrium to the EDA equilibrium, which is only
implemented when it is unique. Regardless of the level of differentiation between brands, the EOA
equilibrium is not feasible. Therefore, the selection of an advertising targeting strategy depends, among
others, on vertical channel interactions between channel members, the level of differentiation between
competitive products, and the relative offensive advertising capacity of the competitors.
In response to the second question, we found that total channel profits are higher in decentralized
channels and lower in integrated channels when the brands are moderately or highly substitutable. Con-
versely, total channel profits of integrated channels are higher than those of decentralized channels in
areas where the products are relatively differentiated and the offensive advertising retaliatory capacity
of the rival is stronger. Under these conditions, decentralized channels implement the EOA equilibrium,
while integrated channels adopt either the ODA equilibrium or the EDA equilibrium.
The findings of this research make two major contributions to the literature. First, they demonstrate
that, whether competing channels are decentralized or integrated, they can properly target their adver-
tising decisions to adapt to their market conditions. Despite the cost saving argument used to support
focusing advertising on a firm’s own customer base in the current literature (e.g., Iyer et al., 2005; Zhang
et al., 2016), manufacturers of substitutable products can be better off when they implement a full differ-
entiated advertising program that appeals specifically to each of the two market segments. This option
is not the least expensive, but it provides better market coverage and drives the prices and profits up.
Alternatively, advertising exclusively to a firm’s own customer base, as suggested in the literature, is
still strategically possible depending on several factors, including the transportation cost, the relative
effectiveness of offensive advertising, and the relative intensity of the rival’s offensive advertising retal-
iatory capacity. On the other hand, in decentralized channels, exclusively targeting the rival’s market base
could be an optimal strategic option as well, especially when the products are relatively differentiated.
A manufacturer can target the competitor’s customer base in anticipation of future advertising assaults
from a more powerful rival. This type of preemptive attack is less likely to lead to a suicidal advertising
war due to its limited scope and impact on the rival when the products are relatively well differentiated
(Steenkamp et al., 2005). As a result, the two manufacturers see no need to defend their own customer
bases. Traditional Lanchester-type models consider similar advertising strategies, although they overlook
vertical interactions and customers’ preferences, among others.
Second, the findings of this research are consistent with the “retailer-buffer” explanation advanced by
McGuire and Stealin (1983). In particular, they support the view that total channel profits are higher in
decentralized than in integrated channels when products are moderately or highly substitutable. Zhang
et al. (2012) reached a similar conclusion when competing manufacturers undertake informative ad-
vertising. In this work, advertising, whether offensive or defensive, could be considered as informative
as it does not aim at changing consumers’ preferences by increasing transportation costs. In addition
to attenuating price competition between highly substitutable products, we found that decentralization
leads to lower offensive and higher defensive advertising investments, unless the corresponding type of
advertising in either centralized or decentralized channels is set to zero. Put differently, manufacturers’
advertising investments may either increase or decrease with decentralization when products are highly
substitutable depending on whether they are primarily targeted to their own customer base or to the
rival’s customer base.
We have simplified this model with several assumptions to allow us to derive meaningful insights.
Some of these assumptions limit the generalizability of our findings. For instance, we have considered
that whether advertising is offensive or defensive, it does not directly change customer preference for
any of the two brands. This is consistent with the view that advertising is mainly informative (e.g., Zhang
et al., 2012). Therefore, our findings may not apply to cases where advertising is persuasive. Given the
multiplicative structure of our demand functions, allowing advertising to directly influence consumers’
preferences makes it very difficult to derive analytical solutions for the different advertising scenarios we
wanted to study in this research. Also, we have considered in this study that retailers set an identical price
for the two market segments to focus exclusively on advertising strategies. Full differentiated strategies
that combine both targeted pricing and advertising decisions simultaneously could also be investigated
(e.g., Iyer et al, 2005; Zhang et al., 2016). Finally, this work could also be extended to integrate local
advertising at the retail level. This will add another layer of difficulties given that channel members may
not agree on the type of advertising to conduct, on top of the traditional vertical free-riding issue in such
a context (Martı´n-Herra´n and Sigue´, 2017).
Acknowledgments
The first author acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Government under research project
ECO2017-82227-P, as well as financial aid from Junta de Castilla y Leo´n VA024P17 and VA105G18,
co-financed by FEDER funds.
References
Coughlan, A.T., 1985. Competition and cooperation in marketing channel choice: Theory and applications. Marketing Science 4, 110-129.
Erickson, G.M., 1993. Offensive and defensive marketing: closed-loop duopoly strategies. Marketing Letters 4(4), 285-295.
Hotelling, H., 1929. Stability in competition. Economic Journal 39, 41-57.
Huang, J., Leng, M., Liang, L., 2012. Recent developments in dynamic advertising research. European Journal of Operational Research 220,
591-609.
Ingene, C.A., Taboubi, S., Zaccour, G., 2012. Game-theoretic coordination mechanisms in distribution channels: Integration and extensions for
models without competition. Journal of Retailing 88(4), 476-496.
Iyer, G., Soberman, D., Villas-Boas, J.M., 2005. The targeting of advertising. Marketing Science 24(3), 461-476.
Karray, S., 2013. Periodicity of pricing and marketing efforts in a distribution channel. European Journal of Operational Research 228(3),
635-647.
Karray, S., Martı´n-Herra´n, G., Zaccour, G., 2017. Assessing the profitability of cooperative advertising programs in competing channels.
International Journal of Production Economics 187, 142-158.
McGuire, T., Staelin, R., 1983. An industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration. Marketing Science 2, 161-192.
Martı´n-Herra´n, G., McQuitty, S., Sigue´, S. P., 2012. Offensive versus defensive marketing: What is the optimal spending allocation? Interna-
tional Journal of Research in Marketing 29, 210-219.
Martı´n-Herra´n, G., Sigue´, S.P., 2018. Offensive and defensive marketing in spatial competition. Journal of Service Research.
Doi.org/10.1177/1094670518819853.
Martı´n-Herra´n, G., Sigue´, S.P., 2017. Retailer and manufacturer advertising scheduling in a channel. Journal of Business Research 78, 93-100.
Moorthy, K.S., 1988. Strategic decentralization in channels. Marketing Science 7, 335-355.
Shaffer, G., Zettelmeyer, F., 2004. Advertising in a distribution channel. Marketing Science 23(4), 619-628.
Shaffer, G., Zettelmeyer, F., 2009. Comparative advertising and in-store displays. Marketing Science 28(6), 114-1156.
Steenkamp, J-B.E., Nijs, V.R., Hassens, D.M., Dekimpe, M., 2005. Competitive reactions to advertising and promotion attacks. Marketing
Science 24(1), 35-54.
Trivedi, M., 1998. Distribution channels: An extension of exclusive retailership. Management Science 48(7), 896-909.
Wang, C.-J., Chen, Y.-J., Wu, C.-C., 2011. Advertising competition and industry channel structure. Marketing Letters 22, 79-99.
Wu, C.-C., Chen, Y.-J., Wang, C.-J., 2009. Is persuasive advertising always combative in a distribution channel? Marketing Science 28(6),
1157-1163.
Zhang, J., Liu, Z., Zhong, W., 2016. Attack and defend; the role of targeting in a distribution channel. Marketing Letters 27, 375-386.
Zhang, J., Zhong, W., Mei, S., 2012. Competitive effects of informative advertising in distribution channels. Marketing Letters 23, 561-584.
Appendix A: Decentralized channels
For the decentralized channels we can analytically characterize the two corner equilibria (EOA and
EDA). However, the interior equilibrium ODA cannot be fully analytically characterized except in the
scenario where δ = θ.
A.1. Interior equilibrium: ODA equilibrium
First we focus on the characterization of interior equilibria.
The retailers are the followers in the Stackelberg game and play a game between them a` la Nash.
Retailer i’s objective function after the expression of the demand function has been replaced reads:
Ri =
n
2t
(pi−wi)
(√
Di(−pi+pj+t)+
√
Oj(pi−pj−t)δ+
√
Oi(pi−pj+t)θ
)
, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
The derivative with respect to pi is:
n
2t
(√
Di(−2pi + pj + t+ wi) +
√
Oj(2pi − pj − t− wi)δ +
√
Oi(2pi − pj + t− wi)θ
)
.
From the first-order optimality conditions for an interior solution, we obtain the retailers’ reaction func-
tions:
pi(wi, wj , Oi, Oj ,Di,Dj) =
Numpi
Denpi
,
where
Numpi = (3t+ 2wi + wj)
(√
Dj
√
Ojδ +
√
Di(−
√
Dj +
√
Oiδ)
)
−
√
Oi(t−2wi−wj)
(√
Dj−
√
Oiδ
)
θ+
√
Oj(t+2wi+wj)
(√
Di−
√
Ojδ
)
θ
−
√
Oi
√
Oj
(
3t(δ2 − θ2) + (2wi + wj)(δ2 + θ2)
)
,
Denpi = 3
(√
Di −
√
Ojδ −
√
Oiθ
)(
−
√
Dj +
√
Oiδ +
√
Ojθ
)
.
Manufacturers i’s objective function after the expressions of the retailers’ reaction functions have been
replaced reads:
Mi =
NumMi
DenMi
,
where
NumMi = 6O
3/2
i c1tδ + nwi(3t−wi + wj)(−
√
Dj
√
Ojδ +
√
Di(−
√
Dj +
√
Oiδ)
+
√
Oinwi(t+wi−wj)(
√
Dj−
√
Oiδ)+
√
Ojnwi(t−wi+wj)(−
√
Di+
√
Ojδ)θ
+
√
Oi(6Djc2tδ +
√
Ojnwi(3t(δ
2 − θ2)− (wi − wj)(δ2 + θ2)))
− 6t(
√
Dj −
√
Ojθ)(Oic1 +Dic2),
DenMi = 6t(
√
Dj −
√
Oiδ −
√
Ojθ).
The derivative with respect to wi, Oi and Di are:
n
DenMi
∆wi ,
1
12
√
Oit(
√
Dj −
√
Oiδ −
√
Ojθ)2
∆Oi ,
1
12
√
Dit(
√
Dj −
√
Oiδ −
√
Ojθ)
∆Di ,
where
∆wi =
√
Oi
[
(t+ 2wi − wj)(
√
Dj −
√
Oiδ)θ +
√
Oj(3t(δ
2 − θ2)− (2wi − wj)(δ2 + θ2))
]
+
(3t−2wi+wj)(−
√
Oj
√
Djδ+
√
Di(
√
Dj−
√
Oiδ))−
√
Oj(t−2wi+wj)(
√
Di−
√
Ojδ)θ,
∆Oi =−12O3/2i c1tδ2 +Oiδ
[
24
√
Djc1t+ (−24
√
Ojc1t+ nwi(t+ wi − wj)δ)θ
]
−
2
√
Oi(
√
Dj −
√
Ojθ)
[
6
√
Djc1t+ (−6
√
Ojc1t+ nwi(t+ wi − wj)δ)θ
]
+
nwiθ
[
Dj(t+wi−wj)+2
√
Oj
√
Ditδ−2
√
Oj
√
Dj(2t+wi−wj)θ+Oj((wi−wj)θ2+t(3θ2−2δ2))
]
,
∆Di =nwi
[
(3t− wi + wj)(
√
Dj −
√
Ojδ)−
√
Oj(t− wi + wj)θ
]
−
12
√
Dic2t(
√
Dj −
√
Oiδ −
√
Ojθ).
i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Equating the above expressions to zero, we get the first-order optimality conditions for an interior
equilibrium, and looking for a symmetric solution w1 = w2 = w, O1 = O2 = O, D1 = D2 = D, these
conditions simplify as follows:
(3t− w)
√
D +
√
O((δ + θ)w − (δ − θ)3t) = 0, (A1)
−
√
Dnwθ − 12Oc1(δ + θ) +
√
O(12c1
√
D + nwθ(3θ − δ)) = 0, (A2)
−12c2D −
√
Onw(3δ + θ) + 3
√
D(nw + 4
√
Oc2(δ + θ)) = 0. (A3)
From (A1) we get w as a function of D and O:
w =
3t(
√
D +
√
O(θ − δ))√
D −
√
O(δ + θ)
.
Replacing this last expression in (A2) and (A3) we have:
−Dntθ+4O3/2c1(δ+θ)2 + 2
√
O(2Dc1+
√
Dntθ2)+O(nt(δ−3θ)(δ−θ)θ−8
√
Dc1(δ+θ)) = 0, (A4)
4D3/2c2−Ont(δ−θ)(3δ+θ)−D(3nt+8
√
Oc2(δ+θ))+
√
D(2
√
Ont(3δ−θ)+4Oc2(δ+θ)2) = 0.(A5)
This system of two nonlinear equations cannot be analytically solved, in general. For the numerical
illustrations presented in the body of the manuscript we have numerically solved this system.
The second-order concavity conditions ensuring an interior maximum for the symmetric solution
(w,O,D) read:
−
√
D + (θ + δ)
√
O < 0,
−2D3/2tw+
√
OD((t2+w2)θ+2tw(δ+6θ))+2O
√
D(t2(δ−3θ)θ−w2θ(δ+θ)+tw(5δ2−10δθ−11θ2))
+O3/2(t2(δ − 3θ)2θ + w2θ(δ + θ)2 − 2tw(5δ3 − 11δθ2 − 6θ3)) < 0,
−D2(9t2 − 12tw + w2) +
√
OD3/2(w2(δ + 2θ) + t2(9δ + 30θ)− 2tw(9δ + 32θ))
+DO(15t2δ(3δ − 7θ) + w2δ(5δ + 3θ)− 2tw(27δ2 − 75δθ − 52θ2))
+O2(3δ + θ)(t2(δ − 3θ)2θ + w2θ(δ + θ)2 − 2tw(5δ3 − 11δθ2 − 6θ3))
−O3/2
√
D(w2(δ+θ)2(5δ+2θ)+5t2(9δ3−12δ2θ−7δθ2+6θ3)−2tw(45δ2−34δ2θ−95δθ2−32θ3)) > 0.
A.1.1. Case θ = δ
For the case θ = δ, system (A4)-(A5) that characterizes the interior equilibria simplifies as follows:
(4c2
√
D − 3nt)(
√
D − 2
√
Oδ)2 + 4
√
Ontδ(3
√
Oδ − 2
√
D) = 0,
(
√
D − 2
√
Oδ)(4
√
D
√
Oc1 − 8Oc1δ −
√
Dntδ) = 0.
From the second equation two options are possible. The first option establishes
√
D = 2
√
Oδ. Re-
placing this value into the first equation, this last equations reads: −4Ontδ2 = 0, and then, O = 0,
and D = 0. Therefore, this first possibility should be removed because we are characterizing interior
equilibria.
The second option establishes 4
√
D
√
Oc1 − 8Oc1δ −
√
Dntδ = 0. Solving for
√
D we get:
√
D =
8Oc1δ
4
√
Oc1 − ntδ
. (A6)
Replacing into the first equation and simplifying, this last equation reads:
−32O3/2c1ntδ2(8Oc21 − n2t2δ2 + 2
√
Ontδ(c1 − 2c2δ2)) = 0.
Taking into account that we are characterizing interior equilibria, this equation implies:
8Oc21 − n2t2δ2 + 2
√
Ontδ(c1 − 2c2δ2) = 0.
Solving for
√
O two possible expressions can be derived, but only one is positive and given by:
√
O =
ntδ
(
−c1 + 2c2δ2 +
√
8c2
1
+ (2c2δ2 − c1)2
)
8c2
1
.
Replacing this value into (A6), the final expression of√D is:
√
D =
−ntδ2
(
−c1 + 2c2δ2 +
√
8c2
1
+ (2c2δ2 − c1)2
)2
4c2
1
(
3c1 − 2c2δ2 −
√
8c2
1
+ (2c2δ2 − c1)2
) .
It can be easily proved that
√
D > 0 for any value of c1, c2, δ and t.
A.2. Corner equilibrium (O = 0): EDA equilibrium
ReplacingO = 0 in (A1) and (A3), and solving this system of two equations, one gets the manufacturers’
optimal strategies in the EDA equilibrium:
wEDA = 3t, OEDA = 0, DEDA =
9n2t2
16c2
2
.
The retailers’ optimal strategies in the EDA equilibrium read
pEDA = 4t.
It can be easily proved that the retailers’ profit function is strictly concave with respect to the decision
variable (i.e. the retail price).
The optimal demand, manufacturers’ profits and retailers’ profits read:
qEDA =
3n2t
8c2
, MEDA =
9n2t2
16c2
, REDA =
3n2t2
8c2
.
The condition on the total demand q1 + q2 ≤ n, taking into account qEDA establishes 3nt− 4c2 ≤ 0.
This last condition can be rewritten as: t ≤ 4c2/(3n).
A.3. Corner equilibrium (O = 0): EDA equilibrium
ReplacingD = 0 in (A1) and (A2), and solving this system of two equations one gets the manufacturers’
optimal strategies in the EOA equilibrium:
wEOA =
3t(δ − θ)
δ + θ
, OEOA =
(
nt(δ − 3θ)(δ − θ)θ
4c1(δ + θ)2
)2
, DEOA = 0.
A positive wholesale price wEOA requires δ − θ > 0.
The retailers’ optimal strategies in the EOA equilibrium read:
pEOA =
4t(δ − θ)
δ + θ
.
It can be easily proved that the retailers’ profit function is strictly concave with respect to the decision
variable (i.e. the retail price) if and only if (δ − θ)(δ − 3θ) < 0. Taking into account the condition that
ensures the positivity of wEOA, the last condition simplifies as
δ − 3θ < 0. (A7)
The optimal demand, manufacturers’ profits and retailers’ profits read:
qEOA =
n2tθ(δ − θ)2(3θ − δ)
8c1(δ + θ)2
,
MEOA =
n2t2θ(δ − θ)2(3θ − δ)(6δ2 + δθ − 9θ2)
16c1(δ + θ)4
,
REOA =
n2t2θ(δ − θ)3(3θ − δ)
8c1(δ + θ)3
.
Under condition (A7) the optimal demand, manufacturers’ profits and retailers’ profits are ensured to
be positive if the following condition applies:
6δ2 + δθ − 9θ2 > 0.
This last condition can be rewritten as follows
δ >
1
12
− 1θ,
or equivalently, δ > 1.144243θ.
The condition on the total demand q1 + q2 ≤ n, taking into account qEOA reads:
nt(δ − θ)2(3θ − δ)θ − 4c1(δ + θ)2 ≤ 0.
This last condition, taking into account (A7), can be rewritten as: t ≤ 4c1(δ+ θ)2/(n(δ− θ)2(3θ− δ)θ).
Appendix B: Integrated channels
For the integrated channels we can analytically characterize the interior (ODA) and corner equilibria
(EOA and EDA).
B.1. Interior equilibrium: ODM equilibrium
Integrated channel i’s objective function, after the expression of the demand function has been replaced,
reads:
Ti =
npi
2t
(√
Di(−pi + pj + t) +
√
Oj(pi − pj − t)δ +
√
Oi(pi − pj + t)θ
)
− c1Oi − c2Di,
i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
The derivatives with respect to pi, Oi and Di are:
n
2t
(√
Di(−2pi + pj + t) +
√
Oj(2pi − pj − t)δ +
√
Oi(2pi − pj + t)θ
)
,
npi(pi − pj + t)
4t
√
Oi
− c1,
npi(−pi + pj + t)
4t
√
Di
− c2.
Equating the above expressions to zero, we get the first-order optimality conditions for an interior
equilibrium, and looking for a symmetric solution p1 = p2 = p, O1 = O2 = O, D1 = D2 = D, these
conditions simplify as follows:
n
t
(√
D(−p+ t) +
√
O(p − t)δ +
√
O(p + t)θ
)
= 0, (B1)
npθ
4
√
O
− c1 = 0, (B2)
np
4
√
D
− c2 = 0. (B3)
Solving these equations, we obtain the equilibrium strategies:
pODAint =
t(c1 + c2θ(θ − δ))
c1 − c2θ(δ + θ) ,
OODAint =
(
ntθ(c1 + c2θ(θ − δ))
4c1(c1 − c2θ(δ + θ))
)2
,
DODAint =
(
nt(c1 + c2θ(θ − δ))
4c2(c1 − c2θ(δ + θ))
)2
.
A positive equilibrium price requires the following condition:
c1 + c2θ(θ − δ)
c1 − c2θ(δ + θ) > 0. (B4)
The second-order concavity conditions, ensuring an interior maximum for the symmetric solution
(p,O,D), read:
−
√
D +
√
O(δ + θ) < 0,
−2
√
Dpt+
√
O((p2 + t2)θ + 2pt(δ + 2θ)) < 0,√
D(p2 − 4pt+ t2) +
√
O((p2 + t2)θ + 2pt(δ + 2θ)) < 0.
The above inequalities under condition (B4) simplify as follows:
−1 + δθ + θ2 < 0,
c22θ
4(−1 + δθ + θ2)− (c1 − c2δθ)2(−1 + θ(δ + 3θ)) > 0,
c22θ
4(−3 + δθ + θ2)− (c1 − c2δθ)2(−1 + θ(δ + 3θ)) > 0.
Demands and total channels’ profits at equilibrium read:
qODAint =
n2t(c1 + c2θ(θ − δ))2
8c1c2(c1 − c2θ(δ + θ)) ,
TODAint =
n2t2(c1 + c2θ(θ − 2δ))(c1 + c2θ(θ − δ))2
16c1c2(c1 − c2θ(δ + θ))2 .
The following conditions need to be imposed on the parameters to obtain non-negative profits, positive
price and demands, as well as to ensure that the sales of the two firms do not exceed the number of
potential consumers:
c1 − c2θ(δ + θ) > 0,
c1 − c2θ(2δ − θ) > 0,
nt(c1 − c2θ(δ − θ))2
4c1c2(c1 − c2θ(δ + θ)) ≤ 1.
B.2. Boundary equilibrium (O = 0): EDA equilibrium
Replacing O = 0 in (B1) and (B3), and solving this system of two equations, one gets the integrated
channel optimal strategies in the EDA equilibrium:
pEDAint = t, O
EDA
int = 0, D
EDA
int =
(
nt
4c2
)2
.
The optimal demand and profits read:
qEDAint =
n2t
8c2
, TEDAint =
n2t2
16c2
.
The condition on the total demand q1 + q2 ≤ n, taking into account qEDAint establishes nt− 4c2 ≤ 0.
This last condition can be rewritten as: t ≤ 4c2/n.
B.3. Boundary equilibrium (D = 0): EOA equilibrium
It can be easily proved that EOA equilibrium is unfeasible.
Replacing O = 0 in (B1) and (B3), and solving this system of two equations, one has two possible
solutions. The first solution establishes:
pE=Aint =
t(δ − θ)
δ + θ
, OEDAint =
(
ntθ(δ − θ)
4c1(δ + θ)
)
, DEDAint = 0.
A positive price imposes δ − θ > 0.
The demand reads:
q = −1
2
n(δ − θ)
√
O.
Therefore, a positive price implies a negative demand, and hence, this first option is unfeasible.
The second possibility with D = 0 is O = 0, and in this case, both the demand and the optimal profits
are zero.
